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Abstract
We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller
firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals
implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm
competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort
levels and higher agent utility, but lower profits for the firms. The winners from
antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also the agents employed by
the competing firms.
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36, D-72074 Tübingen, Germany. e-mail: manfred.stadler@uni-tuebingen.de.
1 Introduction
Agency theory has been developed to overcome the limitations of the monolithic
firm model of classical microeconomics by allowing for interpersonal strategic con-
flicts within firms.1 While it has undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of many
aspects of intrafirm organization like problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion (see, e.g., Alchian, Demsetz 1972, or Holmström 1982), its basic flaw is its
exclusive focus on intrafirm conflicts without considering how these are embedded
in interfirm competition. Our focus is on the coexistence of intra- and interfirm
competition. While Berninghaus et al. (2007) introduce hiring competition on the
labor market via a principal-agent firm organization, we analyze intrafirm conflicts
in an environment where firms compete on the product market (sales competition).
We ask: What does sales competition imply for intrafirm conflicts? And specifi-
cally: How does sales competition affect agents’ effort levels, agent utility, and total
welfare? To answer such questions we analyze the interaction of intra- and interfirm
conflicts within an analytically tractable, deterministic model.
Concerning intrafirm conflicts, principals implement a revenue sharing plan grant-
ing an individual agent a compensation based on relative performance. This com-
pensation mechanism is not only plausible (as compared to, e.g., fixed-prize tour-
naments) but is also empirical relevant: Rent-sharing, either in its explicit form
through revenue-, gain- or profit sharing plans, or - even more prominent - rent-
sharing in its implicit form with high profit firms paying high wages is widely spread
in the organizational practice. Further, when revenue-sharing plans are in place,
we observe that an individual agent’s portion of the overall revenue share varies ac-
cording to his position and performance. For instance, in the well-known Japanese
bonus payment tournaments as studied e.g. by Kräkel (2003), the total wage sum is
determined by a process of collective bargaining (and will most certainly depend on
the firm’s profitability), and an individual worker’s share of that collectively deter-
mined wage sum is set according to the worker’s relative performance as measured
in the evaluation process (“satei”) (see Endo 1994). We analyze such a compensating
scheme without asking whether this scheme is optimal.2
1Durable monopolies, for instance, allow for intrafirm strategic conflicts in the sense of intertem-
poral price competition (the monopolistic seller can serve demand earlier or later and thus engages
in price competition which approaches homogenous price competition when customers become very
patient (see Coase 1972 and Güth, Ritzberger 1998)).
2Güth, Levinsky, Pull, Weisel (2010), for instance, have shown both, theoretically and experi-
mentally, that variable prize tournament incentives (the wage sum depends on firm profitability, i.e.
on collective effort) are cost minimizing as compared to piece rates and fixed prize tournaments.
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Concerning interfirm competition our analysis complements the wide class of strate-
gic competition models. In the Industrial Organization literature, the main focus
has been on the strategic implications of managerial incentives on price and quan-
tity competition (see, e.g., Vickers 1985, Fershtman 1985, Fershtman, Judd 1987,
2006, Sklivas 1987, Hermalin 1992, Cailland, Jullien, Picard 1995, Schmidt 1997,
Jansen, van Lier, van Witteloostuijn 2007). In these models, the delegation prob-
lem is reduced to the incentive schemes for managers implemented by the owners of
the firms. However, intrafirm conflicts between the workers within a single firm are
usually excluded from the analysis.
Concerning the combination of intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition on prod-
uct markets, our work relates to that of Raith (2003) as well as to that of Lin (2008).
Raith (2003) analyzes compensation systems based on piece rates and focuses on the
product market structure being endogenously determined by firms’ entry and exit
decisions. Lin (2008) studies the effect of the product market price on fixed prize
tournament incentives but largely neglects the interaction between intrafirm con-
flicts and interfirm competition by assuming that the product price does not depend
on agent effort.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
model of a monopolistic seller firm with several agents. Section 3 adds a second
seller to analyze the effects of interfirm competition with a given number of agents.
Section 4 derives the full incentive scheme by endogenously determining the number
of agents to be employed by the rivals when respecting the agents’ participation
constraints. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Monopolistic Seller Firm
We begin our analysis by limiting strategic interaction to conflicts within a sin-
gle firm. Consider a product market with a linear demand function that can be
normalized (via appropriate choices of monetary and sales units) to
D(p) = 1 − p .
If the seller firm produces q units of the good, market clearing requires the price
p = 1 − q .
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The firm employs n agents whose effort choices ek ≥ 0; k = 1, ..., n, determine the





In order to be able to concentrate on the interaction effects between the agents of
the firm and for reasons of model tractability,3 we abstract from any informational
asymmetry between principal and agents concerning an agent’s effort choice and in-
stead assume each agent’s output to be (i) verifiable and (ii) a deterministic function
of individual effort, i.e. we assume individual agent output to be a perfect signal
of individual agent effort. Effort costs are assumed to be private, but commonly




To start with, assume that all agents are already employed so that we can neglect
additional fixed wages and agents’ participation constraints. Later on we will show
that participation constraints can be used to endogenously determine the number
of agents employed by the firm.
The principal of the firm determines the revenue share s ∈ [0, 1], offered to the
agents as a whole. Agents are assumed to be identical and to distribute their overall
revenue share spq proportionally according to each agent’s individual contribution
ek/q, as suggested by equity theory (see, e.g., Homans 1961).
4 This means that each
agent realizes the net utility
U(ek) = sekp − e2k/2 = sek(1 − q) − e2k/2 .
Maximization of utility U with respect to efforts ek leads to the first-order conditions
s(1 − q − ek) − ek = 0
for k = 1, ..., n. The second-order conditions are obviously fulfilled. The unique
solution to this equation system is the symmetric effort
e∗(s, n) =
s
1 + (n + 1)s
.
3Due to the nonlinearity of the profit functions, our model would not be analytically solvable
any more if we added a random variable.
4Contestant heterogeneity, e.g. in the sense of agents differing in their (marginal) costs of
effort, might question the fairness of such reward schemes which may, in turn, crowd in other
regarding concerns like inequity aversion concerning agents’ earnings (see Bolton, Ockenfels 2000
and Fehr, Schmidt 1999). Here, we abstract from contestant heterogeneity for the sake of analytical
tractability.
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The agents’ equilibrium effort depends positively on the revenue share s but neg-
atively on the number n of agents employed by the firm. Anticipating the agents’
effort decisions, the principal’s profit function is
π(s, n) = (1 − s)ne∗(1 − ne∗)
=
ns(1 − s2)
[1 + (n + 1)s]2
.
The first-order condition for maximizing profit π with respect to the revenue share
s leads to the cubic equation
(n + 1)s3 + 3s2 + (n + 1)s − 1 = 0 , (1)
implying a negative relationship between the number n of agents and the revenue
share s offered by the principal. This cubic equation has the single real solution
s∗(n) = u + v − 1/(n + 1) ,
where u = (D1/2−b)1/3, v = (−D1/2−b)1/3, D = a3+b2, a = [(n+1)2/3−1]/(n+1)2
and b = −[(n + 1)2 − 1]/(n + 1)3.
Given the equilibrium revenue share s∗, it is straightforward to calculate the equi-
librium effort e∗ of the agents and, hence, the firm’s profit π∗ and the agents’ utility
U∗. The welfare consisting of the firm’s surplus (principal and agents) as well as the
consumer rent can be calculated as
W ∗ = (1 + p∗)q∗/2 − ne∗2/2 .
Table 1 presents the details of the solution for various numbers n = 1, 2, ... of agents
employed by the monopolistic seller.5 As can be seen, the equilibrium revenue share
s∗ as well as the equilibrium effort level e∗ decrease in the number of agents. The
profit π∗ increases in the number of agents and approaches the value 1/4 of the
traditional monopoly model (in the case of zero production cost) when n tends to
infinity. Welfare W ∗ also increases and approaches the value 3/8 of the traditional
monopoly model for n → ∞. The reason is that the equilibrium effort of each agent
becomes negligible and that marginal effort costs converge to zero when the number
of agents approaches infinity.
5A similar table for heterogenous agents, e.g. nl low-cost agents and nh high-cost agents with
nl, nh ≥ 1 and n = nl + nh ≥ 2, would be less illustrative but could be derived numerically. Our
focus, however, is on the number n of agents and its limit cases n = 1 and n → ∞.
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n n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 ... n → ∞
s∗ 0.317 0.250 0.208 0.176 0.152 0.133 ... 0.000
e∗ 0.194 0.144 0.114 0.094 0.079 0.069 ... 0.000
q∗ 0.194 0.288 0.341 0.374 0.395 0.414 ... 0.500
p∗ 0.806 0.712 0.659 0.626 0.605 0.586 ... 0.500
π∗ 0.107 0.153 0.178 0.193 0.203 0.210 ... 0.250
U∗ 0.031 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003 ... 0.000
W ∗ 0.156 0.226 0.263 0.286 0.301 0.314 ... 0.375
Table 1: Numerical results for various numbers n of agents employed by a monopo-
listic seller.
Allowing for non-negative fixed wages in addition to the revenue shares and assuming
non-binding participation constraints would change neither e∗(s) nor s∗. The firm
would like to hire as many workers as possible to reduce the revenue share s∗. An
endogenous number of agents results, however, if a participation constraint U ≥
Ū > 0 is taken into account. The higher the reservation level Ū , the less agents will
be willing to accept the labor contract - although the agents’ revenue share increases
when n becomes smaller.
In the next step we introduce a second seller firm to analyze the effects of strategic
interfirm competition on the equilibrium incentive scheme (section 3) and on the
number of agents hired by the rivals (section 4).
3 Seller Competition with a Given Number of
Agents
When several firms compete in serving demand, the assumption that principals
share revenues with their agents implies that interfirm competition involves both
hierarchy levels, principals and agents. To demonstrate the effects of such intrafirm
as well as interfirm competition, we restrict ourselves to the case of two competing
firms i = 1, 2 on a homogeneous market with n agents each and firm specific sales
amounting to qi =
∑n
k=1 ei,k. As in the case of a monopolistic seller firm, we start
by assuming an exogenously given equal number n of employees in each firm. Later
on we will endogenously determine the number of agents employed and justify firms’
symmetry.
The inverse demand function can now be written as
p = 1 − q1 − q2 .
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Each of the agents, k = 1, ..., n, employed by firm i = 1, 2, realizes net utility
Ui,k(ei,k) = siei,kp − e2i,k/2 = siei,k(1 − q1 − q2) − e2i,k/2 .
Maximization with respect to the efforts ei,k yields the agents’ first-order conditions
si(1 − q1 − q2 − ei,k) − ei,k = 0; i = 1, 2; k = 1, ...n ,
whose symmetric solution is
e∗i (s1, s2) =
si(1 + sj)
1 + (n + 1)(si + sj) + (2n + 1)sisj
, i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Anticipating these equilibrium efforts, the profit functions of the two principals are
πi(s1, s2) = (1 − si)ne∗i (1 − ne∗i − ne∗j), i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The first-order condition for maximizing the profits πi(s1, s2) with respect to si and
the obvious symmetry of the solution leads to the quadratic equation6
(2n + 1)s∗2 + 2s∗ − 1 = 0 , (2)
implying again a negative relationship between the number n of agents in each firm




2n + 2 − 1
2n + 1
,
implying the symmetric effort levels
e∗(s∗) =
s∗
1 + (2n + 1)s∗
=
√




6One might wonder why the equation in the duopoly case is quadratic whereas the corresponding
equation (1) in the monopoly case is cubic. To understand the difference in the degrees of the
polynomials, consider the more general inverse demand function
pi = 1 − qi − dqj ; i, j = 1, 2 ,
where d ∈ [0, 1] measures the heterogeneity of the market. In this generalized setting, the solution
is the fourth-order equation
[(1 − d2)n2 + 2n + 1]s4 + [4(n + 1)]s3 + [(1 − d2)n2 + 2n + 4]s2 − 1 = 0 .
In case of d = 0, the market is segmented into two independent monopoly markets. By factoring
out [1 + (n + 1)s] > 0, the solution equation degenerates to (1). In case of d = 1, the market is
homogeneous. By factoring out (1 + s)2 > 0, the solution simplifies to (2).
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for all 2n agents employed by the two competing firms. The profits of the principals
are thus
π∗ = (1 − s∗)ne∗(1 − 2ne∗) = ns
∗(1 − s∗2)
[1 + (2n + 1)s∗]2
.
The welfare in the homogeneous market adds up to





= q∗ = (1 − p∗)/2 is a single firm’s output. Table 2 illustrates how
the solution (s∗, e∗, q∗, p∗, π∗, U∗,W ∗) depends on the number n of agents employed
by each seller. Again, the equilibrium revenue share s∗ decreases in the number n
of agents as do equilibrium effort levels e∗. The agents’ utility levels are decreasing
throughout whereas the profits follow an inverted U-shape. For small numbers of
agents, profits increase (as it was already derived in the monopoly case), but for
larger numbers, the counteracting interfirm competition effect dominates and profits
decrease. Interestingly, profits do not converge to the level of 1/9 of the Cournot-
duopoly (in the case of zero production cost) but rather to zero for n approaching
infinity. The reason is that our model does not only feature the competition of
principals but also that of agents. It is the interfirm competition on both hierarchy
levels7 which drives the price down to zero when n tends to infinity.
n n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 ... n → ∞
s∗ 0.333 0.290 0.261 0.240 0.224 0.211 ... 0.000
e∗ 0.167 0.118 0.092 0.076 0.065 0.056 ... 0.000
q∗ 0.167 0.237 0.276 0.304 0.325 0.336 ... 0.500
p∗ 0.667 0.527 0.446 0.392 0.350 0.328 ... 0.000
π∗ 0.074 0.088 0.091 0.090 0.089 0.086 ... 0.000
U∗ 0.023 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 ... 0.000
W ∗ 0.250 0.334 0.374 0.400 0.418 0.427 ... 0.500
Table 2: Numerical results for various numbers n of agents, employed by each of the
two firms.
In order to assess the effects of selling competition on intrafirm conflicts we com-
pare the monopoly case with 2n agents (section 2) to the duopoly case with each
firm employing n agents. Obviously, introducing selling competition results in a
7In case of employment contracts offering piece rates instead of revenue shares agents would
not compete but rather face isolated optimization tasks.
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higher equilibrium revenue share s∗, higher equilibrium effort levels e∗, and a higher
aggregate output. Consequently, the equilibrium price p∗ and profits π∗ are lower
with selling competition while welfare W ∗ is higher. Agents thus prefer an organi-
zational structure where they are employed by several principals rather than by a
monopolistic firm, employing all of them. The winners from antitrust policy, e.g.
merger control, are thus not only the consumers, but also the agents employed on
the market.
4 Seller Competition with an Endogenously De-
termined Number of Agents
Until now, the number of agents was exogenously given and assumed to be equally
distributed across the two seller firms. In order to endogenously determine the
number of agents in each firm, we now allow firms to hire an unequal number of
agents. The first-order conditions of the agents’ maximization problem lead to the
same efforts e∗i (s1, s2) by all ni agents in firm i where
e∗i (s1, s2) =
si(1 + sj)
1 + (ni + 1)si + (nj + 1)sj + (ni + nj + 1)sisj
, i = 1, 2, i 6= j,
depends positively on the own firm’s revenue share si, but negatively on the rival
firm’s revenue share sj and also negatively on the numbers ni and nj of agents,
employed either by the own or by the rival firm.
Anticipating these equilibrium effort levels, the profit functions of the two principals
are
πi(s1, s2) = (1 − si)nie∗i (1 − nie∗i − nje∗j), i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The principals i = 1, 2 simultaneously maximize their profits with respect to si and
ni. Maximization with respect to si and imposing symmetry again leads to condition
(2). Differentiation with respect to ni gives
∂πi/∂ni|si=s∗,ni=n∗ = (1 − s∗)e∗(1 − 2n∗e∗)2
=
s∗2(1 − s∗2)
[1 + (2n∗ + 1)s∗]3
> 0, i = 1, 2 ,
such that both principals want to hire as many workers as possible. As agents always
have an incentive to equally distribute over firms, this result justifies the symmetry
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assumption used in section 3 where the number n of agents in each firm can now be
interpreted as half of the whole relevant labor force.
If the number of agents in the relevant workforce goes to infinity, the number of
agents employed by the firms can be endogenously determined by accounting for a
binding participation constraint for the agents, given by U ≥ Ū > 0. The symme-
try of the participation constraints again ensures that both firms employ the same
number of agents. For example, if Ū = 0.005, it can be seen from Table 1 that the
monopolistic firm will employ only n = 4 agents, while it becomes obvious from
Table 2 that in the duopoly case both firms will hire n = 3 agents each so that
in total 2n = 6 agents will be employed. This increasing number of agents has a
counteracting effect on the revenue share s∗ and the effort level e∗ of agents so that
the total effect is, in general, unclear even if all of our numerical solutions indicate
the positive effects to dominate. Since the participation constraint is equally bind-
ing in both cases, agents are indifferent between working in a monopolistic or in a
duopolistic firm. Nevertheless, due to the incentives of agents, the equilibrium mar-
ket structures still consists of two symmetric rivals. As with non-binding constraints,
welfare W ∗ increases due to seller competition.
5 Conclusion
We presented a model featuring strategic interaction not only within a firm but also
between firms where both, principals and agents of firms, compete with each other.
In our view, intuition based on models dealing either only with intrafirm or only
with interfirm competition can lead us astray.
Our analysis has shown that the usual results of (duopolistic) sales competition
become questionable when not only principals but also their agents interact strate-
gically. For a given number of agents we have shown that these prefer an industry
organization where they are employed by several firms rather than by one single firm.
The incentive provided by the revenue-dependent compensation schemes increases
due to seller competition, leading to higher effort, larger output, and a lower market
price. The winners from antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also
the agents employed by competing firms.
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